In addition to selected Circuit Court cases from various counties across the State, we also publish selected Circuit Court Business and Technology opinions – found on the Maryland judiciary website--with the added features of each posted case on Maryland Decisions is formatted, summarized and headnoted-- and has a unique cite. This makes it much easier to use these cases in any memo or brief. The Business and Technology opinions we have posted so far are:

Clark v. Zalco Realty, Inc., 1 Md. Dec. 714 (2013)

Finding that Plaintiff, a condominium owner, was entitled under Section 11-116 of the Maryland Condominium Act to inspect and copy various documents from the condominium management. These included detailed billing reports or supporting documentation for management’s legal invoices concerning his unit, and e-mails between the Defendant management and Defendants’ counsel concerning the financial well-being of the condominium.  But the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for written advice of Defendants’ legal counsel, finding that the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine were not overcome by Section 11-116.

 White Flint Realty Group v. Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, 1 Md. Dec. 676 (2014)

Granting attorney’s fees in a complex case. After a settlement was reached in the underlying case, a motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses was filed by Plaintiff--along with a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The Court employed the eight factor test described in Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, along with additional considerations: the amount requested in relation to the dollar amount recovered, terms of any fee agreement, court’s own experience in similar types of litigation, and any other factor that relates to attorneys’ fees requested in the specific case before the court. After a thorough examination of all the factors and relevant considerations, the court awarded Plaintiff $3,520,256.59 in attorneys’ fees (and $411,391.88 in costs and expenses).

McDonald-Lerner v. Neurocare Associates, 1 Md. Dec. 608 (2013)

Finding that express federal pre-emption does not apply. After spinal surgery resulted in injuries, Plaintiffs sued various Defendants, alleging among other things, that the "off label" use of a specific medical device during surgery contributed to the injuries. Defendants sought to dismiss the complaint, claiming that whether the use of the Class III medical device is "off label" or is used according to the Food and Drug Administration's approved use, a state court action involving this medical device is expressly preempted. The Court determined that express federal preemption did not apply to the “off-label” use of this medical device. The Court decided that the present lawsuit did not run contrary to federal preemption policy and that the Medtronic Defendants could not rely on express federal preemption to avoid state court liability. Also, the lawsuit alleges parallel claims sufficient to escape preemption. The motions to dismiss were denied.

Gregg LaPointe. v. Sigma Tau Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 1 Md. Dec. 530 (2013)

Finding that the “unity of interest” doctrine does not entitle summary judgment for Defendants. A group of former employees of a pharmaceutical company brought an action against its controlling company and its major stockholder, alleging that the controlling company and its major stockholder wrongfully interfered with the long- term benefit plan that they had entered into with the pharmaceutical company. Defendants filed for summary judgment asserting a “unity of interest” between the parent company and its wholly-owned subsidiary, and by this doctrine the parent and the subsidiary are treated as one--and a party cannot be held liable for wrongfully interfering with its own agreement. Deciding an issue of first impression in Maryland, the Court held that the privilege granted by the “unity of interest” doctrine is not absolute. That is, the privilege of the “unity of interest” doctrine does not lie if the parent acts contrary to the interest of the subsidiary, or interferes with the contract or relationship by use of wrongful means. Because there is a material dispute of fact regarding whether controlling company or its major stockholder used wrongful means to interfere with the contract between the Plaintiffs and the pharmaceutical company, the motion for summary judgment was denied.

Corvex Management LP v. CommonWealth REIT., 1 Md. Dec. 437 (2013)

Ruling that the parties have a duty to arbitrate. Arbitration is strongly favored as a matter of public policy coupled with the general rule that the parties’ intentions control as to when an agreement to arbitrate exists, where the arbitration agreement was spelled out in the company’s bylaws and also referenced by provisions in the sale of stock in that company, a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement exists and controls here, and thus the parties have a duty to arbitrate.

Saxon v. Emmett, 1 Md. Dec. 217 (2009)

Finding that discovery is permitted as to allegations of improper service of process. Discovery will be permitted as to the defendant's allegation of improper service of process, since the defendant conceded actual knowledge of the lawsuit, and the service of process was left with his wife --a suitable person of age and discretion--at their Virginia abode. Defendant insists that he has moved from the abode, but his affidavit does not address some pertinent issues in that regard, for example: 1) that he no longer owns or has an interest in the residence where his wife received the summons and complaint; 2) that he is in any way estranged from his wife; 3) that he has permanently relocated; 4) the reason for the alleged  “relocation;” 5) that he is no longer registered to vote in Virginia; 6) that he no longer holds a Virginia driver’s license; or 7) that he informed the Supreme Court of Virginia where he currently resides for purposes of maintaining his law license.

Saul Holdings Limited, et al. v. Raquel Sales, Inc., 1 Md. Dec. 197 (2009)

Ruling that accelerated rent provisions in a commercial lease unenforceable. In this commercial lease, the damages agreed upon are not permitted by Georgia law, that is, without accounting for the future probability of re-letting the premises. Moreover, the accelerated rent provision awarded a lump sum payment of a rent discounted to present value for a period of approximately seven years, plus possession of the premises. However, the landlord was able to re-let the premises to another tenant for five years and damages for that period are now a reasonable estimate of damages resulting from the original tenant's breach. Also, the two year period remaining in the lease, following expiration of the lease term of other tenants brought into the lease, is too far in the future to account for the probability of re-letting the premises again, and again results in damages that are too speculative and uncertain. Thus, the accelerated rent provision fails as a liquidated damages provision, therefore the Court finds that it was a penalty, and thus unenforceable.

RCC, Inc. v. Guiseppe Cecchi, 1 Md. Dec. 129 (2010)

Denying attorney- client privilege in requests for discovery. The "intermediary doctrine" of attorney - client privilege has not been recognized in Maryland by a reported decision of either the Court of Special Appeals or the Court of Appeals. Also, it appears that the "intermediary doctrine" and the "derivative privilege" doctrine are one and the same. To the extent that it is its own separate doctrine, it usually applies to the translation of information to and from the attorney. In any event, the privilege should be strictly confined so that it does not engulf all manner of services performed for an attorney. In this case, plaintiff has not met the burden of showing that the "intermediary doctrine" would protect the documents from discovery under attorney - client privilege.

Hospitality Partners v. Brewmasters Hotel, 1 Md. Dec. 85 (2011)

Denying post-judgment motions. Defendants' stated ground for terminating Plaintiff's contract "for cause," was found by the jury to not be in accord with the evidence. The jury found that the Plaintiff was not grossly negligent in its duties under the contract and the jury rejected the Defendants' common law theory of termination, finding that Plaintiff did not materially breach the agreement. Plaintiff had proven that it was damaged by the Defendants' termination, and the jury awarded damages in the amount of $2,880,801. Thus, the Court on post-judgment motions did not disturb the jury's verdict.

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CIRCUIT COURT AGREES WITH DISTRICT COURT THAT DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY ASSESSED IN FAVOR OF LANDLORD IN A COMMERCIAL LEASE DISPUTE

When tenant (Etta’s Beauty Salon, Inc.) failed to execute a note for a new lease, the landlord (Parkside Shopping Center) brought an action in District Court for Baltimore County, alleging that tenant was still bound by the original lease terms. Although the tenant had surrendered the leased premises before the action was brought and the landlord had re-let the premises, the landlord alleged that tenant owed the landlord the balance of rent on the original lease (until the new tenants began to pay rent). To this, the landlord added pre-judgment interest and attorney’s fees. The tenant, meanwhile, countered that certain correspondence which supposedly terminated the lease applied or that the landlord had tacitly terminated the original lease by showing the property while tenant was still occupying it. The District Court agreed with landlord and assessed damages of: $15,261.28 in principal, $9,112.91 in pre-judgment interest, $2,289.19 in attorney’s fees, and $190.00 in costs. 

The tenant took an appeal to the Circuit Court. No hearing was requested. In reviewing the transcript from the District Court proceeding, reviewing all exhibits, and trial memoranda, the Circuit Court found no clear error and affirmed the judgment of the District Court.

Parkside Shopping Center, LLLP v. Etta's Beauty Salon, Inc., et al., 1 Md. Dec. 648 (2014) Circuit Court for Baltimore County (Ruth Ann Jakubowski, J.) (March 14, 2014) 

ON DISTRICT COURT APPEAL, CIRCUIT COURT AGREES WITH JUDGMENT, FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF CORPORATION DID NOT PROVE GOOD STANDING TO SUE

Plaintiff printing company (S&S Graphics d/b/a Westland Printers) brought action against Defendants (Menu Mailer, Inc. and Cowboy Trucking d/b/a Cowboy Printers) in the District Court for Cecil County, charging them with failure to pay Plaintiff for work done. However, Defendants required Plaintiff, under Maryland Rules 3-201 and 3-308, to prove the good standing in Maryland for Plaintiff’s corporation. Specifically, the Defendants sought in their Demand for Proof: the legal existence of the parties, the capacity of the parties to sue or be sued, the authority of the parties to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, and the execution of a written instrument which the Plaintiff sues upon. When Plaintiff submitted insufficient evidence at trial to meet these demands for proof, Defendants moved for judgment. The District Court (Stephen Baker, J.) granted Defendants’ motion.

On appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment.

S&S Graphics, LLC v. Menu Mailer, Inc., et al., 1 Md. Dec. 398 (2013), Circuit Court for Cecil County (Jane Cairns Murray, J.) (April 18, 2013)